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Reflexivity and the Sociology of Science and Technology:
The Invention of “Eryc” the Antibiotic
Fran Collyer
University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Until recently, the social-technical process of invention has fallen between
sociological investigation of the genesis of a new idea (an ideational
phenomenon) and the production of a new technology (a material phenomenon).
The advent of post-modernism and post-structuralism offered new avenues for
theorising invention, accounting for, on the one hand, its material nature, and, on
the other, its ideational nature, through the notion of socio-technical ensembles:
phenomena constructed through the co-producing, mutually constitutive action of
actants (both human and otherwise). This paper argues that despite its potential,
theorising within the sociology of science and technology is hampered by
insufficient attention to the role of the researcher and the concept and practice of
reflexivity. Reflexive practices within this field of knowledge are explored, and
drawing on an empirical case study of an antibiotic preparation, a case is made
for the necessity of reflexivity in the production of knowledge about invention.
Key Words: Science, Technology, Reflexivity, and Sociology
Studies of science, technology, and the innovation process have enabled
significant developments to be made in our understanding of the process of invention.
Various disciplines, including sociology and philosophy, have offered theoretical tools
for the examination of the intellectual endeavours and technological accomplishments of
humankind, and in the process, thrown into relief some of the many difficulties inherent
in the historiography of science and technology. Notable here would be, for example,
efforts to comprehend the possibility of producing valid knowledge despite the
researcher’s enmeshment within the social context of which they are themselves a
creation (e.g., Mannheim, 1960, pp. 71, 264); or the extent to which it may be possible
for conclusions to be drawn that might be other than a mere reflection of the researcher’s
position within the social structure (Bourdieu, 1994). Yet the compilation of detailed
sociological knowledge about the processes of invention has been severely restricted over
the past century by disciplinary boundaries and sub-field distinctions. These issues,
which are discussed at length in the first section of the paper, have resulted in a
fragmented field of knowledge with insufficient emphasis on the role of the sociological
researcher. This individual is entrusted with the task of “discovering” past achievements
and the “assemblage” of the historical case study - a tool widely used for organising and
presenting information about the scientific past - so that they may add to disciplinary
knowledge about invention: yet the researcher remains an invisible component in any
conventional accounting of an invention. Despite the centrality of the sociological
researcher to the development of sociological knowledge about the mechanisms of the
invention process, critical questions about the researcher’s role remain unasked: How are
unknown aspects of the past “made known” by the researcher? What enables a researcher
to locate “missing” voices, events or achievements? To what extent can a researcher
“reveal” the historical junctures and pathways of a technology?
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The work of the sociological researcher in producing knowledge about the science
and technology process is yet to be fully studied or theorised. In order to begin this
process, this paper examines the nature of reflexivity in the invention process.
Reflexivity is essentially concerned with questions about how an individual might come
to produce an account of an aspect of reality (Fuller, 1995b, p. 161). An argument is
made that studies of invention have primarily conceived reflexivity in moral and
philosophical, rather than methodological and epistemological terms, thus obscuring the
much more critical role of reflexivity in the research process. Employing an empirical
case study of the invention of “Eryc” - an antibiotic product - this paper demonstrates the
critical impact of the sociologist, arguing that reflexivity is an essential component of the
production of knowledge about the invention process. A new concept - primary
analytical reflexivity - is proposed as a means to fully comprehend the missing element in
the process through which a researcher can be acknowledged to have taken a legitimate
place in the social (or socio-technical) construction of an invention, as well as in the
production of historiographical accounts of the past.
Previous Developments and the State of the Field
“Invention” has for some time been a problematic concept, given that it may refer,
in common discourse, to the creation of either ideational or material products. For
several decades during the latter half of the 20th century, the study of invention fell,
rather awkwardly, between two fields of research. One field, that of innovation,
technological change, and the social impact of technology, focused on the “material”
nature of invention; while the other, the investigation of the world of science, intellectual
production, and the laboratory, examined the ideational aspect of invention. The first
field of knowledge became popular during the 1970s, and, when applied to medicine,
either focused on the introduction of technologies to the market and their adoption by
doctors, hospitals and clinics (e.g., Greer, 1985; McKinlay, 1981); or the social impact of
an innovation (e.g., Bates & Lapsley, 1985; Faden & Kass, 1993). These studies of
technology generally placed little emphasis on the processes which preceded the
“promising report” or media announcement of a “scientific breakthrough” (McKinlay),
and gave more attention to the diffusion process, where doctors and hospitals “adopted”
technologies which were presumably invented elsewhere (e.g., Evans, 1993; Martin,
1993; Pasveer, 1989). Despite the value of these approaches for revealing the social
problems of new technologies, there was a growing recognition within sociology of the
need to move beyond an essentialist conception of technology, and consider how
technologies themselves might embody social values (e.g., Harding, 1991; Raymond,
1979; Woodward, 1970, p. 14).
The second body of knowledge encompasses a rather diverse field, and includes
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, the Sociology of Science, Laboratory Studies, as
well as sociological offerings from the History and Philosophy of Science. Increasingly
prevalent from the mid 1960s, these studies systematically investigated science as a realm
of social activity and a form of organisation (e.g., Barnes, 1977; Bloor, 1975; Mulkay,
1979; Traweek, 1988; Whitley, 1982). Eschewing the commercial and industrial
orientation evident in the Innovation studies approach (e.g., Abernathy & Utterback,
1978), and the essentialism of the technology studies perspective, these dealt with
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“invention” in terms of “conceptualisation”, theorising the creation of “mental products”
as a social process shaped by social relations and social context. Although no consensus
was reached within these fields over theoretical frameworks, program objectives or
identifiable boundaries for a sub-discipline; they stood as an alternative to biological or
psychological theories of creativity, where inventors were believed to have an “inherent
propensity” toward creative behaviour (cf. Bienaymé, 1986, p. 139; Collyer, 1997, p.
195-196). Often, but not consistently ethnographic in method, scholars produced insights
into the day-to-day processes of scientific practice through a focus on “unfinished
knowledge” or knowledge “that is yet in the process of being constituted” (Knorr-Cetina,
1995, p. 141). Here too was a growing recognition of the paucity of current theories; in
this case, in dealing adequately with the material world (e.g., Barnes, p. 25-26; Bury,
1986; Woolgar, 1987). The persisting lacuna in this theoretical field constituted a
particular problem for invention, for this phenomena has the capacity to take the form of
an idea, concept, theory, technique, “tacit” knowledge, formula, device or machine, and
so traverses the many possibilities between the ideational and material worlds.
Theoretical developments in both fields came with the diffusion of postmodernism and post-structuralism. Mirroring developments in other fields of sociology
such as gender, sexuality and health, where the perishable, suffering, corporeal, embodied
individual began to be taken into account (e.g., Harraway, 1991; Turner, 1984); the
sociological study of science and technology answered with an array of conceptual
frameworks and programs. Though there have been many attempts to delineate the
boundaries between their fields, formulate unique identities, and offer coherent principles
for future research; there has been a blurring between philosophical, historical and
sociological approaches (cf. Shapin, 1995, p. 289), and between theoretical and
epistemological frameworks. Thus many of the same authors (such as Callon, Collins,
Fox Keller, Knorr-Cetina, Latour, Law, Mulkay, Pinch, and Woolgar), their works, and
conceptual frameworks, are claimed equally by several sub-fields or program areas (as
found in, for example, Fuller, 1995a; Jasanoff, 2000; Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen, &
Pinch, 1995; Pinch, 1993). While no consensus has been, or is likely to be reached on
how this diverse field might be identified, and though it may be useful to distinguish
between them for other purposes, there is no necessity in this paper to do so. Instead the
term “the sociology of science/technology” will suffice to refer to this rather
heterogeneous body of literature, which shares little more than a commitment to
sociologically explaining either the social or the socio-technical basis of science and/or
technology.
One recent approach within this literature is the actor-network theory of Callon,
Law and Latour, where the “technical” and “the social” are defined only in relation to one
another, as a “seamless web”, and not as an interaction between two distinct ontological
phenomena (cf. Callon, 1986; Hughes, 1986; Latour, 1987, 1991, p. 129). For the first
time since the birth of the modern sociological project with Parsons’ 1937 Structure of
Social Action, and the subsequent exclusion of biology and the physical environment
from legitimate sociological inquiry; “the social” lost its favoured status (cf. Collyer,
2010). In this new framework, material elements were conceived not as passive aspects
of reality, but “participants” in “social ordering” (Callon & Law, 1997, p. 167). This
opened a theoretical “space” for invention, for it was argued that technologies and
humans interact upon one another, and in the process, elements are created, modified and
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transformed. Thus the inventor and the invented are co-produced in a translation process
(Knorr-Cetina, 1995, pp. 145-146; also Latour, 1991, p. 116).
The emergence of actor-network theory has also re-invigorated theoretical
development regarding social constructionism. The origins of the constructionist
perspective are integral to the origins of sociology itself, for its principles were formed in
historic debates over the identity and nature of the emerging discipline. Though Marx,
Weber, and Durkheim are not constructionists according to modern usage of the term,
their work is suggestive of its later principles. For example, Weber proposed knowledge
to be a body of value-ideas constructed “in the mind” through a subjective process
directed by the value-orientation of the researcher (1949, pp. 80, 94), but given
objectivity (i.e., shared meaning) by its production within social interaction (1968, p.
519). Similarly, both Marx and Durkheim theorised ideas and knowledge as reflecting,
respectively, the social structure and social organisation of society. These, along with
more recent contributions from sociologists such as Alfred Schutz and Pierre Bourdieu,
offered a perspective in which knowledge and reality are products of society, and “facts”
are historically located and collectively produced.
The constructivist perspective is often targeted for its relativistic stance, for it has
traditionally proposed “reality” as not external to social life, but embedded within and
(largely or wholly) determined by it. As a consequence, knowledge of the world is
“constructed” rather than directly “captured” or “discovered” in the process of
“knowing”; and a product of subjective cognition. The development of actor-network
theory, in repositioning the concept of “the social”, has re-problematised the notion of
“the real”, spawning debate over realism versus idealism, and objectivity versus
subjectivity, and, perhaps coincidentally, a range of new philosophical and sociological
positions, including “subtle realism” (Hammersley, 1992) and “critical” or “reflexive”
realism (Layder, 1998; Porter, 1993). There have been many critiques of actor-network
theory, despite its popularity and wide application in fields as diverse as computers and
information systems, education, management and development studies. This theoretical
framework has also been vigorously defended (e.g., Callon, 1998; Callon & Law, 1997;
Latour, 1994; Law, 1992). Critiques have focused on its masculinist, Machiavellian and
Hobbesian interpretations of human nature; its characterisation of the actor as a selfseeking entity intent on building networks, prestige and power (e.g., Martin, 1998;
Shapin, 1995); its inadequate theorisation of power and social structure (e.g., Collyer,
1997; Kleinman, 1998); and the propensity toward colonisation hidden with its liberaldemocratic plea for the liberation of the machine (Lee & Brown 1994). However few
concerns have been voiced over the epistemological and methodological implications of
actor-network theory.
Actor-network theory does not merely replace social constructionism with sociotechnical constructionism, but re-configures the relationships between the “knower”, the
production of knowledge, and the “known”. Within the sociology of knowledge, these
relationships are captured with the methodological principle of reflexivity, which enables
the researcher to produce authentic knowledge even though they are enmeshed within the
world they study. Reflexive practices include self-reflection on the part of the researcher
upon their presence, and provide the means to assess the extent and nature of social
influences on the research process. The notion of “reflexivity” can be traced back to
Weber and Schutz with their ideas of philosophical self-reflection and the search for
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hidden influences on one’s work. Though the concept has a variety of meanings in the
social sciences (cf. Lynch, 2000, pp. 27-34), and been challenged by the post-modernist
and post-structuralist notion of a plurality of meanings and forms of knowing; scholars
generally retain the core idea of the researcher as required to “provide an account of
social reality that can explain how the theorist could come to have such an account”
(Fuller, 1995b, p. 161).
Given the considerable overlap between the sociology of knowledge and the
sociology of science/technology (for both are concerned with the analysis of the nature of
knowledge itself), and the recent status of reflexivity as a moral imperative and means for
social scientists to access both resources and status (cf. Lynch, 2000; Maton, 2003, p.
54); it is somewhat surprising to find the latter body of literature lacking in reflexive
practices.
Yet this has been a sustained criticism within the sociology of
science/technology (e.g., Fuller, 1995b; Woolgar, 1991; Woolgar & Ashmore, 1988, p.
2). The next section demonstrates how reflexivity has, and has not, been addressed in a
sample of studies from the sociology of science/technology. It indicates that these
criticisms are at least partially true, for there are some aspects of reflexivity, particularly
the “core” principle outlined above, which receive insufficient attention in practice.
Reflexivity in the Sociology of Science/Technology
One of the more significant features of post-modernity for theorists such as
Foucault, Derrida, Bauman, Beck, Giddens and Lash, is its reflexivity. As Bauman
(1991, p. 272) argues, “Postmodernity is modernity coming to terms with its own
impossibility; a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously discards what it was
once unconsciously doing”. For scholars working within the field of the sociology of
science/technology, reflexivity has not been a significant issue of debate, but nevertheless
appears on the agenda (e.g., Bloor, 1976, Collins, 1990; Fuller, 1995b; Woolgar, 1991).
This has arisen in part, because of a broader epistemological shift since the 1960s across
the social sciences and the arts, with a rejection of positivist and idealised images of the
natural sciences, redefined notions of objectivity and value-neutrality, and challenges to
expertise and authority. Yet it appears there is a measure of truth in complaints about the
lack of reflexivity in the sociology of science/technology, for closer analysis indicates
only a limited form of reflexivity is practiced in this field.
In her analysis of sociological approaches to the research process, Stanley (1996)
discerns two forms of reflexivity, descriptive and analytical. The first, arising as a term
in the 1960s in feminist critiques of research methodology and the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge, refers to the influences on the researcher from the social context (including
the relations of power), and of the social interaction between researcher and the subjects
of the research. This form of reflexivity has been taken up with some vigour by
sociologists generally, and, despite complaints to the contrary, can also be found within
the sociology of science/technology. For example, the studies by Måhlck (2001), Cohen,
McAuley, and Duberley (2001), and Roth and Bowen (2001), demonstrate how
knowledge, or the processes of knowledge production, are shaped by social context or
social structures of power. Similarly, Blume’s (2000) study of the cochlear implant
reflects at length on how the author’s values and interests (as a sociologist and father of
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two deaf children), influence the research process, his interaction with participants, and
his views and knowledge of the technology.
The second form of reflexivity, analytical reflexivity (Stanley, 1996), is
apparently more difficult to accomplish and rarely found. Analytical reflexivity involves
an explanation of the processes through which the researcher reaches an understanding of
the phenomena; that is, how they “construct” their knowledge claims. This second form
of reflexivity appears to be the concern of Fuller (1995b, p. 161), for in making a case for
a widespread lack of reflexivity, points to the works of Lash, Beck and Giddens, arguing
that none of the theorists discuss how they came to understand reflexive modernity itself:
a crucial issue given they are themselves products of the uncertainties of which they
speak. This raises the question of how a researcher might be uniquely capable of
obtaining knowledge from which others are barred. This is the conundrum which some
other theorists, such as Bourdieu, seek to resolve.
Bourdieu (1994) theorises how a form of knowledge can be produced which is
more than the partial, positioned view of the individual scholar, and equally more than
the sum of multiple, individual viewpoints. In other words, how the structured, collective
nature of science might enable the production of a form of knowledge which escapes the
confines of the apparently inevitable positionality of the individual producers of
knowledge. For Bourdieu, the escape from the “gravitational effects” of a researcher’s
intellectual field can be transcended through a process of epistemic reflexivity (Bourdieu,
1994; Maton, 2003, p. 57).
According to Bourdieu (1994), the researcher or “knower” enters into an
objectifying relationship with the “object” of knowledge in the production of knowledge,
and engagement with epistemic reflexivity means “making the objectifying relation itself
the object of analysis” (Maton, 2003, p. 57). This procedure is not individualised but a
collective practice, for it comprises not just the self-fascinated, individual’s values,
interests and commitments, but a structured enterprise of the scientific field as a whole
(cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 72). Epistemic reflexivity thus differs from
descriptive reflexivity (that is, the form of reflexivity generally carried out by
sociologists), because rather than a focus on the relationship between the researcher (or
knower) and knowledge, it focuses on the relations between the researcher and the object
of knowledge (cf. Maton). However Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, though
insightful, does not offer a means to operationalise epistemic reflexivity as a collective,
rather than individual research strategy (Maton, p. 58), and moreover, tends to create a
boundary between the knower and the object of knowledge which verges on positivism: a
boundary which other sociologists are inclined to render more permeable or indeed even
abandon.
An alternative to Bourdieu’s framework is provided by Weber. Though far less
recent, Weber’s books, including The Methodology of the Social Sciences, remain
incomparable for their attention to the form of reflexivity under discussion here. In
Weber’s theory of knowledge, the process of knowledge production involves the scholar
as a historically located actor whose actions are social and thus oriented toward meaning.
This means knowledge is never created in the abstract, but an outcome of social
processes (Weber, 1968). During knowledge production, the scholar comes to “know”
about reality through a subjective process of evaluating the “infinite empirical context”
and constructing a view, theory or perspective according to their value-orientation
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(Weber, 1949, p. 78). The value-orientation of the scholar directs them toward what is
culturally significant, narrowing the field and enabling the actor to “make sense” of the
empirical context (Zaret, 1980, p. 1183). This social process has both subjective and
objective dimensions. It is subjective because it is always an evaluation. “Every
meaningful value-judgement about someone else’s aspirations must be a criticism from
the standpoint of one’s own Weltanschauung; it must be a struggle against another’s
ideals from the standpoint of one’s own” (Weber, 1949, p. 60). On the other hand,
historical analysis is not subjective, meanings are shared, and not “valid” only for each
individual (Weber, 1949, pp. 83-84). “Objectivity”, according to Weber (1949, p. 60), is
not where an analysis “captures reality” through value-neutrality, for an “attitude of
moral indifference has no connection with scientific ‘objectivity’”. Instead, the process
of knowledge production can be objective because the scholar obtains a sense of cultural
significance from prevailing evaluative ideas (Weber, 1949, pp. 83-84), disciplinary
knowledges, and their own experience and analytical training (1949, pp. 79-80).
In this subjective/objective process, knowledge is not “discovered” but a product
of human reason (Månson, 2000, p. 79; Weber, 1949, p. 106). The empirical “objects of
analysis”, that is, “facts” or “the known”, are not given, but “constructed” by the social
actor (Zaret, 1980, p. 1183), for “we comprehend reality only through a chain of
intellectual modifications” (Weber, 1949, pp. 80, 94). In other words, we do not merely
“select” which aspect of reality to study, or how to understand a given phenomenon, but
“construct” that phenomenon, for “there is nothing in the things themselves to set some
of them apart as alone meriting attention” (Weber, 1949, p. 78).
Reflexivity occurs for Weber when the scholar reflects upon what Bourdieu later
described as the objectifying relations between the researcher and the object of
knowledge (Bourdieu, 1994; Maton, 2003). Most scholars, Weber claims, conflate the
abstract categories and concepts they use to produce knowledge with reality itself, and
forget these are merely tools to understand reality (1949, p. 85; also 1964, pp. 140-145).
This principle differentiates Weber’s analyses from those of many other scholars, because
he remains cognisant of the distinction between an “ideal type” (a “mental construction”,
see 1949, pp. 101-103), and the “intrinsic” nature of reality; for he argues the former is
always partial, distorted, and logically extreme (1949, pp. 72-73, 170-172; also Kalberg,
1997, p. 222). Weber’s distinction between mental constructions and empirical reality is
the basis of analytical reflexivity, for in practice this requires reflection upon the process
through which the scholar produces the object of knowledge. It is this form of reflexivity
which enables the collective, structured practice of scholars to escape the “gravitational”
effects of positionality.
In the sociology of science/technology, two examples of analytical reflexivity can
be provided. Both represent case studies of controversies in science/technology which
examine the processes through which researchers construct their arguments. Turner
(2001, pp. 477, 499) argues for the need to apply critical reflexivity to ensure an
awareness of how an author’s own narrative choices “dictate the political and moral
arguments implicit in each account ... [and] ... determine the way in which particular
accounts of technoscientific controversies work, and what they ultimately mean”. For
Rees (2001), the main topic of discussion is the methodological practice of observation in
a case study of infanticide among primates. Nevertheless Rees includes an insightful, if
brief, discussion about how the field workers presented their arguments to form
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coherence, what evidence they focused on (and importantly, what they ignored), and how
they offered different interpretations, even with access to the same observational reports.
For Rees (2001, p. 523), differences emerged because researchers “filtered” “facts”
according to “relevance”. Although these two examples display analytical reflexivity,
their focus is the practice of other researchers: not of the author. Thus they represent
examples of what we might term secondary analytical reflexivity.
Examples of primary analytical reflexivity are more difficult to locate, for this
requires the researcher to apply the principles of analytical reflexivity to their own work.
There is little within the field of sociology of science/technology to compare with the
efforts of Weber’s (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In the
book’s introduction, and also elsewhere (e.g., Weber, 1949, p. 71), Weber insists that
despite its value as an exploration of the ideational foundation of capitalism, it offers an
incomplete analysis of historical change. In other words, it disregards the multiplicity of
causal forces in order to offer an “antidote” to prevailing materialist analyses. With the
exception of Weber’s book, there is a paucity of primary analytical reflexivity in many
literatures. In the sociology of science/technology, this is particularly problematic when
investigating the nature of invention. The next two sections will outline the method of the
case study research, and then go on to demonstrate how Weber’s notion of reflexivity can
be applied in a case study of an invention. The case for reflexivity will be made not just
on moral grounds, but as a means to better comprehend the phenomena which is the
object of study: the invention of technology.
A Case Study of an Invention
Personal statement. This paper draws on a piece of empirical research
conducted while a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Flinders University
of South Australia in the early 1990s. My interest in the subject of invention had been
stimulated in the years prior to my candidature, when working as a researcher in a
consultancy firm attached to Wollongong University, the centre for Technology And
Social Change (TASC). Clients for the centre came from both government and industry.
Much of our research focussed on the impact of new technologies on social relationships
and institutions (e.g., predicting the need for a re-skilling of the workforce if new banking
or engineering technologies were to be introduced). Although working at the centre gave
me the opportunity to utilise, and hone, my qualitative and quantitative skills, and
certainly enhanced my project management skills, the clients of the centre were
predominantly “Right Wing”, “Dry” or “Neo-liberal” in orientation; and the provision of
research and consultancy services in this atmosphere became increasingly unsatisfactory
for an idealistic and essentially “Left-Wing” sociologist. Having been granted a
scholarship for further study, I “escaped” happily to academia where I was less
constrained by politics and the iron bands of bureaucracy. I spent the next three years as
a post-graduate student exploring the social construction of technologies, free to critically
theorise and question all aspects of the invention and innovation process, including the
client’s motives, the policy context, and the influence of the researcher’s values and
political beliefs. After completing the PhD I spent some years employed on short-term
academic contracts, and in 1999 was appointed to the University of Sydney. Although
the research from which this paper has been drawn was completed some years ago, these
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reflections are very recently composed. In one sense, this paper reflects what I was
attempting to write in my thesis, but at that time I had insufficient command of the
theoretical and conceptual literature to express such complex thoughts. It was only after
re-reading Weber, and coming to a more mature appreciation of his reflections on the
nature of history and historiography (cf. Collyer, 2008), that the central ideas of this
paper could be articulated. In essence, these ideas have been in a “development phase”
for the past two decades.
The study. The subject of the case study is the invention of “Eryc”, an antibiotic
product on the international market. The case study results from data gathered from 20
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key-informants. Participants cover a broad
range of interests, occupations and perspectives; including government officials, industry
representatives (marketing, sales, scientists, management), university scientists,
researchers, medical practitioners, and members of medical organisations such as the
Pharmacy Guild and the Australian Society of Hospital Pharmacists. Potential
interviewees were identified through a “snow-balling” method, and the interviews, which
were conducted in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra, were between one and
four hours duration. All were tape-recorded and transcribed with permission of the
participants. At the time of the interviews, the university did not require sociologists to
seek permission from an institutional ethics committee for non-invasive, non-clinical,
social research. Nevertheless, the researcher adhered to the ethical guidelines of The
Australian Sociological Association, which can be found at www.tasa.org.au/ethicalguidelines/
“Constructing” or “Discovering” an Invention
In the Innovation literature, the process through which a researcher finds a subject
for study is rarely problematised, as technologies are perceived as ontological entities
defined by market “success”. While there are “failed” inventions, these are merely
“scientific breakthroughs” which did not fully develop into technological products, or
products which did not survive the market process: either as a consequence of
inadequacies within the product itself, the structure of the market (cf. Abernathy &
Utterback, 1978), or a lack of powerful sponsorship (cf. McKinlay, 1981). The sociology
of science/technology literature similarly offers little in the way of reflection on the role
of the researcher and the methods used to produce an account of the birth of an idea or
technology (cf. Shapin, 1995). Generally speaking, authors do not reflect on how they
“selected” a subject for the case study, but begin with their “object of analysis”, and
proceed to examine its “history”, and the cultural, political, economic and/or technical
factors which shaped the technology’s trajectory over time (e.g., Drake & Purvis, 2001).
Studies focusing on “originating ideas” and the context of science, rather than
technologies per se, are equally culpable in their lack of primary analytical reflexivity.
These locate the focus of their research through a process similar to that used in the study
of a technology, for scientific activity is considered in many ways to parallel the
processes of the broader market. Within scientific networks, “unfinished knowledge”
(Knorr-Cetina, 1995, p. 141), and “mere opinion”, become new knowledge through
formal and informal competitive structures. These structures force scientists to “say
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something new”, connect people and organisations, and actively “push” discoveries
through, “selling” new ideas and techniques to others (Fuchs, 1993). Compared with the
Innovation literature, a more critical approach is taken toward the subject matter, for
“discoveries” are not ontologically given entities which remain unchanged as they
become innovations, but modified by the various agendas and interests of the scientists.
Hence their final form may be quite different from the original (Brannigan, 1981).
Nevertheless, the researcher is able to unproblematically obtain a focus for their study by
examining, for example, the contents of newspapers for evidence of a “scientific
controversy”, or the scientific journals to locate “breakthroughs” which have excited the
interest of scientists and attracted resources. As such, this process is little different from
the innovation researcher who might “select” a successful technology from an
examination of stock market reports. In both cases, a “history” of a product or idea
appears to be based on an abstract, rational process of “history writing”; and working
backward from the present “success”, “controversy” or “breakthrough”, to a possible
originating context.
The actor-network approach differs somewhat from this format. Here the focus of
a case study is not the “invention” or “breakthrough” itself, but the network of which it is
part. Thus the invention is not theorised as an “entity”, that is, a distinct object with wellestablished boundaries, but a “compound reality” and set of relations (Callon & Law,
1997). Nevertheless, the process through which these “breakthroughs” and innovations
become the subject of the research (and thus come to constitute “knowledge” of the
invention), is not problematised. Researchers produce all forms of knowledge through
calibration, measurement and theorising (cf. Latour, 1987, p. 256), but the “critical
judgement” of the researcher, though necessary to the research process (cf. Bijker, 1993),
is not given specific attention. Instead, the notion of a privileged “outside observer” is
rejected as an “epistemological myth” (cf. Latour, 1998). There is therefore, little
acknowledgement that the “selection” of a focus for examination is itself a process of
knowledge building: of producing knowledge about knowledge. Amidst the amorphous
relations of the actor-network, the researcher, seeking to describe and explain its
formation, is not accorded particular significance.
However it can be suggested that the historical and social location of the
researcher is of central importance, not just to the relationship between the “knower” and
the “knowledge” they construct, but also to the relations between the “knower” and the
object of knowledge. Over recent decades, studies within the sociology of knowledge
have drawn attention to the inherently social basis of knowledge production, revealing an
unequal and hierarchical structure within which core, Western countries dominate
(Connell & Wood, 2002). Within this system, case studies of “major breakthroughs”,
“scientific controversies”, and “new technological trajectories”, focus on events
considered significant to members of the core nations, while other developments are less
likely to be documented. A researcher located in either the periphery or semi-periphery
(to borrow Wallerstein’s terms), is constantly made aware of this facet of knowledge
production, and hence ideally positioned to question what may be standard practice
elsewhere (though not ideally positioned to successfully challenge the status quo).
Moreover, in a country where its own developments are usually over-looked by the core
research community, a researcher is rarely in a position to “select” an object for analysis
from an existing reservoir of ideas already documented by other social actors. In other
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words, while researchers in core countries are busy revising their histories, in the
periphery these “histories” are relatively less complete, and a more complex process of
construction is required. Despite its disadvantages, the general lack of scholarly
knowledge about the past in peripheral, or semi-peripheral countries, represents an ideal
context in which to explore how an object of analysis is constructed for historical
analysis, and can be used to demonstrate reflexivity as a pre-requisite for the production
of knowledge.
Self-reflection on the researcher’s motivation and interests might be regarded
merely as a form of narcissism, where the researcher usurps the object of study in a form
of confessional autobiography (cf. Maton, 2003, pp. 55-56). However such selfreflection gives way to primary analytical reflexivity where an opportunity appears to
escape the “gravitational effects” of one’s intellectual field. The case of “Eryc” offers an
example of this, for the semi-peripheral location produced a determination in the
researcher to “find” an Australian pharmaceutical invention to demonstrate the relevance
of Australian science and contribute to the literature. Important also was discipline-based
knowledge about the state of the Australian pharmaceutical industry, which, despite the
support of governments during the 1970s and 80s through the construction of state-owned
companies (such as CSL and Fawnmac), and research and development tax assistance
programs (such as the Factor F scheme), did not survive subsequent privatisations and
budget cuts. By the 1990s the industry had returned to its dependence on foreign imports
and was once again dominated by the subsidiaries of transnational or international firms
(Kot & Petit-Young, 1990, p. 407; PMSC, 1991, pp. 3-7).
Such knowledge of the industry sector provided not an impediment, but an
impetus to the search for an “invention” which might “lie in waiting” for a curious
researcher. While Australia’s position on the semi-periphery of the global economy and
its internal political, cultural and economic structure means that it has only 0.7% of the
share in patent families and is a net importer of technologies such as licences, patents and
technical assistance (OECD, 2000, pp. 52, 54); the output of Australian scientists
(measured by the publication of papers) is on a par with countries such as the United
States (measured relative to population) (OECD, p. 51). In other words, although
Australian’s rarely maintain ownership of their “inventions”, they are relatively
successful in creating them. Such knowledge only encouraged the researcher's
determination to “find” an Australian pharmaceutical invention and demonstrate the
relevance of Australian scientists to the history of science and technology.
Documentary searches and preliminary discussions with members of the medical
and scientific communities unearthed little of interest. Driven by a sense of nationalism,
and perhaps reformist zeal in the face of perceived global injustice, the researcher
persisted with the belief that Australian scientists must have been successful at least once,
and was spurred into further action (as scientists are when they scent the possibility of
“making a discovery”), when it became increasingly obvious that if there had been any
inventions, these had not yet been included in the historical record. Eventually a retired
scientist suggested an approach to F.H. Faulding, one of the few Australian-based
companies (and the only one focusing on pharmaceuticals rather than over-the-counter
products). With little conviction in his voice, the scientist stated: “if anyone has come up
with something, it would be within Faulding”.
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Initial inquiries at Faulding failed to produce a candidate for research. At first
this appeared to be a problem of language, for the words “invention”, “breakthrough”,
“new technology”, and “innovation” suggest events of “world changing” magnitude.
Given this connotation, participants could not envisage a connection between historic
change and the mundane tasks of their daily work environment. Though the terms do not
preclude the idea of an invention as merely a modification of an existing idea or process,
or new ways of drawing on existing ideas or techniques; they are more often assumed to
refer to a radical departure from established knowledge and practice. As one participant
suggested, the word technology does not invoke the idea of something that could have
been achieved 25 years previously with the same instruments or materials:
When I think of ... [new technologies in medicine] I think of banks of instruments,
computers, catheters, wonderful wiring and information, transplants, endoscopic
surgery, micro-surgery perhaps ... that sort of thing. That is what I call
technology. (Doctor, Interview 7)
The researcher, well-versed in theories of science and technology, encouraged
participants to consider technology in terms of modifications and the borrowing of ideas
and established practices from outside the firm itself. Participants began to discuss
technology in these terms and consider whether there may have been some past events
within the firm which influenced medical practice or enabled Faulding to offer a new
product or process for the market. Discussion focused on the history of the firm, which
had been started by Francis Hardy Faulding in May 1845, and had, over the intervening
decades, operated essentially as a warehouse for the importation of both medicinal and
non-medicinal products, limiting its manufacturing activities to products which were
either generic, or based on licences from overseas companies. Several participants
suggested that at some stage, Faulding had ended its “warehousing” role and become
active in research and the development of its own pharmaceutical products. This
produced some consideration of which product may have been the first of the new era.
Eventually one of Faulding’s staff brought up the case of erythromycin, an
antibiotic which had been, rather fondly, given the name of “Eryc”. Discussion amongst
participants focused on whether it was accurate to call this an “invention”, and what
might have been new about Eryc. It was quickly agreed that the active antibiotic
substance from which Eryc is made is not the “new” component. Erythromycin products
had been available on the market in a variety of forms since the 1950s, and indeed
Faulding was, in the 1960s, producing erythromycin stearate under licence to Abbott
(meaning that Abbott owned the patent), and selling this product as “Ethryn” on the
Australian market. Dismissed also was the idea of Eryc as “new” and “unique” because
of the enteric coating process used to protect the drug’s active ingredient, or even the
substance applied in the coating process. The coating substance had previously been
approved for such use by government authorities, and the practice of coating active
ingredients was becoming common as a drug delivery system at the time of the Eryc
development (cf. Illum & Davis, 1987). Further, the company had previously used the
coating method for an earlier product - Prodopa - which was released for hospital use in
1972. Staff also dismissed the idea that Eryc was “new” because the active ingredient
had been formed into tiny round pellets and evenly coated with a polymer, weighed and
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placed inside a gelatine capsule. This process too had been used in the past. It was
eventually agreed that the “new” element of Eryc was the idea of combining the three
processes with the antibiotic erythromycin.
A focus on the value-orientation of the socially-located actors provides additional
insights into how the construction of Eryc as an “invention”, was shaped by interaction
with the staff of Faulding. Although initial communication faltered over the definition of
such terms as “invention”, “technology”, “new”, and “breakthrough”, it eventually
became apparent there was more to the problem than language, for these were not
universal nor value-neutral concepts but context-specific and value-laden. How an actor
understands an event or phenomenon from the past will depend on the actor’s social and
historical location. In medicine for example, clinical practitioners are particularly
disinclined to label their work as “new”, for this may give the impression techniques are
experimental, untested or unsafe. This pragmatic conservatism among practitioners was
in evidence in this study, when one participant stated:
As far as a GP is concerned, even with the new drugs that are released by
the government or even those subsidised by the government, there is an
old saying, “Don't be the first doctor to try a new drug nor the last.”
(Interview 2)
Researchers in a research environment, on the contrary, have a stronger incentive
to label their work “new”, and may even exaggerate differences between existing and
previous practices or products (Collyer, 1994a); while researchers in a commercial
environment are inclined to consider technologies to be “inventions” only where they
offer direct commercial potential and can attract copyright or patent protection.
Moreover, in one social context, minor changes may be considered innovatory, whereas
in another, constant change may be the “norm”. For example, surgeons working within
the speciality of plastic surgery often find themselves facing unique and unusual
problems. Plastic surgeons contend they must constantly improvise and “make up
operations to suit circumstances” (Collyer, 1994b). Surgeons are thus likely to consider
their work an extension of medical practice rather than an invention. In some other areas
of medicine even minor modifications from standard practice are unusual (and likely to
bring censure or litigation), and hence the construction of “new technologies” is a less
frequent event. Given this context-specific and value-laden nature of invention, a very
different focus for the case study would have emerged if instead of seeking the assistance
of research and marketing staff from Faulding, it had begun with participants from the
medical community.
The case of Eryc indicates that an object of analysis (such as an invention) is not
“discovered” but “constructed”, and demonstrates how this might occur in an interactive
process between social actors, where at least one of the actors is the researcher. For the
research to proceed, Eryc had to be “constructed” as a “social fact”, as it had not
previously been granted the status of an “invention” in prevailing discourse (either
informally or by an historian), and so had to be given salience through social action. In
the case of Eryc, “social action” included the interests and value-orientations of the
researcher and the participants. Analytical reflexivity indicates these were integral to the
research process, for Eryc would not have been “discovered” without the introduction of
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prevailing theories of science and technology to prompt actors to reflect on past
experience in new terms. This indicates the researcher was not a passive agent in the
production of historical knowledge. Analytical reflexivity also reveals Eryc was not an
unproblematic, ontological, technical entity “waiting to be discovered”, but a sociotechnical construction birthed, in large part, during the research process itself.
“Constructing” or “Discovering” the Inventor
Progress with the building of the case study of Eryc met with further difficulties
when it became time to identify the source of the invention. It is not uncommon for the
identity of the inventor to be disputed when the history of a technology or scientific
breakthrough is being recounted. This is no less true in the case of Eryc. Company
literature and many participants in this study identified the “inventors” of Eryc as Brian
Davies (the Marketing Manager) and Michael Story (a development engineer). However
a small number pointed to Bernard Boggiano, an employee of the company, two pointed
to individuals outside Faulding, such as Lloyd Sansom, Sidney Bell, or Peter McDonald,
and one participant volunteered the name of the then Managing Director of Faulding, Bill
Scammell. The identity of many individuals who might also have taken some part in
events during the 1960s and 70s, including Richard Handcock and Bill O'Reilly, appear
to have largely disappeared from the historical record.
In part, these diverse perspectives on the originator of Eryc, and the disappearance
of some individuals from the historical record, can be understood as effects of the
differing socio-historical locations of the participants in the study. Engineers or
marketing staff for example, were more interested in, and knowledgeable about past
events and individuals with a bearing on their own profession. As a result, these
participants pointed to the importance of Davies and Story, who handled the process of
production of the bulk product and the public announcement of Eryc as a “medical
breakthrough” during the mid 1970s. In contrast, members of the scientific and medical
community remarked upon the roles of actors within their own fields: such as Bernard
Boggiano (a research chemist), Don Sorrell (a microbiologist), Tom Hemmings (a
research pharmacist), Michael Gleeson (a chemist), or Peter McDonald (a microbiologist
who organised the clinical trial and steered the product through government registration
procedures).
However, the identification of a given individual as “the inventor” is also
dependent on the intellectual tradition within which the researcher operates. From an
Innovation Studies perspective, an inventor is one who can be most closely associated
with a marketable or patentable product. Scientific theories or clinical problems
connected with the product are of less importance, and merely provide context or
“background”. In the case of Eryc, the focus within this tradition would be on the events
of the 1970s (when the product entered the market) and the roles of Story and Davies. In
contrast, this researcher took a sociology of science/technology approach, and therefore
focused on historic events prior to the development of a market product. There are, as
Mulkay (1979, p. 74) suggests, advantages in concentrating on the stages before an
intellectual consensus is reached, when knowledge of the empirical world becomes
solidified and difficult to conceive in any other form. From inside this tradition,
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individuals such as Boggiano and Gleeson, and events of the 1960s become critical
elements of the historical narrative.
Once the data has been gathered, the next phase for the researcher is to assemble a
case study or “history”. From a sociology of science/technology perspective, the
conventional approach is to identify a group of individuals who can be closely associated
with a “scientific breakthrough”, new theory, or innovation; and evaluate their relative
contributions. The temporal ordering of events, ideas and actions become an important
tool for the researcher in this process. An understanding of the competitive context of
science is also of assistance, as it is generally agreed that recognition and reward are not
based on merit alone (cf. Clarke & Montini, 1993; Goldberg, 1988). As a result, the
researcher generally seeks to critically assess the various contributions, aware of the
possibility that not all contributers will have been publicly acknowledged. A case study
may then be produced, placing the central figures, ideas and events within a social
context in order to explain the social forces determining or shaping the scientific or
technological trajectory. The first draft of a case study of Eryc proceeded according to
this standard formula, and is briefly narrated below.
The Invention of Eryc
During the 1960s, a number of medical and scientific workers became interested
in the problems with the clinical use of erythromycin: a common and readily available
antibiotic. Articles in clinical and pharmaceutical journals at the time suggested the
absorption of erythromycin into the blood of the patient was extremely low and erratic
(e.g., Goodwin, 1967). Even after being given high doses of the drug it was sometimes
up to 12 hours before patients could benefit from the medication. Given that the drug
was administered for the control of infection, the lack of predicability of the dosage was
considered a serious problem, as patients might be left without medication for extended
periods during which no supplementary medication could be given. The popular
explanation for low and erratic absorption was that erythromycin was destroyed by the
body’s own protective mechanisms in the blood.
By the mid 1960s, reports were appearing in The Lancet and other
medical/scientific journals about another product, Levodopa, suggesting its active
ingredient was being destroyed by the acidic environment of the stomach. Boggiano, as
Product Manager at Faulding, considered whether the reports about Levodopa might be
applicable to erythromycin:
I began to get ideas of what was wrong with erythromycin stearate ... little
dawnings of ideas began to come out between Don Sorrell, myself, and
Tom Hemmings ... that perhaps erythromycin stearate wasn’t all that it
was made out to be. (Boggiano, Interview 9)
Boggiano believed the solution to this problem might lead to a new antibiotic
product. Leading a small team, Boggiano started work in 1968 on a new erythromycin
stearate product which would have an enteric coating to protect the active ingredient
against gastric acids. Ethryn Cota-Tabs was launched in 1970. This was not heralded as
a “breakthrough”, for there was, at this stage, no scientific proof the coated product was
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more efficacious, nor sufficient evidence to disprove claims by the rival company
(manufacturing the leading brand of erythromycin), that the uncoated product was selfprotective against gastric acids. Spurred on by colleagues such as pharmacokeniticist
Sidney Bell (an expert on the bodily absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of
drugs) from the School of Pharmacy at the Institute of Technology; Boggiano and
Gleeson set up an experiment in the early 1970s, to provide scientific proof of the
destruction of erythromycin by gastric acids and evidence of the lack of therapeutic
potential if given in the standard formulation. The results were first presented at The
Chemical Society meetings and company-sponsored gatherings, and it is alleged attempts
were made at these events, and over subsequent months, to intimidate the pair into
withholding the evidence. Indeed, as a sales representative of a rival company suggested,
they should not “kill the goose which laid the golden egg”. Boggiano and Gleeson
nevertheless wrote up the results of the study and submitted the paper for publication in
1973. Publication was unusually slow, perhaps because one of the key referees was an
employee of a rival company; and it was another three years before the paper appeared in
an academic journal (cf. Boggiano & Gleeson, 1976). The case of Eryc is not unique in
this regard. Other scientists have reported similar problems, given that it is up to their
peers - who are often also their competitors - to “approve” their work and allow it to be
made public (e.g., Goldberg, 1988, pp. 56, 63). Moreover, sociological studies of science
have documented the misunderstandings and resentments which characterise scientific
practice over the circulation or withholding of scientific information (cf. Mulkay, 1979,
p. 71).
During the early 1970s, efforts were also made to improve the Faulding product,
Syndopa, which was not enteric coated. Bill Scammell had spent most of 1968 in Europe
and America and brought back many ideas for the improvement of existing drug products
and new developments in equipment for pharmaceutical production. He and Boggiano
decided they could improve Syndopa by combining the idea of an enteric coating with a
process of pelletisation. Pelletisation had been thought for some time to be a means to
improve the absorption of drugs. Boggiano and others argued that the irregularity of the
delivery of a drug into the blood system was the result of the action of the pyloric
sphincter (a little valve which acts to prevent large particles from passing through the
stomach into the intestine). Tablets could be trapped in the stomach until they were
broken into small pieces, a process which could take as long as 12 hours. In some
instances however, the tablets could escape through the valve by chance; in which case
the active ingredient would have an immediate effect. Pelletisation offered a possible
solution, for tiny pellets were thought to be treated as a liquid by the body and able to
travel at a predictable and constant rate through the pyloric sphincter. In 1972, Faulding
launched a new product, Levodopa, which was both coated and pelletised. This product
was produced only in small quantities for hospital use and not released onto the
international market.
Despite the coating of erythromycin in Ethryn Cota-Tabs, clinical experience
continued to indicate problems with absorption of the antibiotic. Between 1971 and
1973, Boggiano and his team at Faulding, supported by company board member Bill
Scammell, developed the idea of a new erythromycin product. This time it would be both
coated and pelletised, like Levodopa. By the end of 1972, “Eryc” was starting to become
more than an idea, and by 1973 Boggiano had a proto-type which he tested on himself
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with the help of a neighbour and local general practitioner, Adrian Vanderborch.
Engineer Michael Story was busy in 1973 solving the problems of the production
process, for the firm’s existing pelletisation equipment was not suitable for bulk
manufacturing. A small trial of Eryc occurred in 1974 after the finalisation of the
formulation (this time on Boggiano and his biochemist colleague Bob Braybrook), and a
more systematic clinical trial was led in 1975 by Peter McDonald (McDonald, Mather, &
Story, 1977) on staff at the Flinders Medical Centre: a hospital recently constructed and
fully staffed but yet to be opened to patients. Eryc was finally launched in Australia in
1977.
Analytical Reflexivity and the Case of Eryc
This account of the “history” of Eryc centres around the historical “moment” in
which a scientist or scientists experience a “gestalt” switch; where a solution to a problem
appears solvable by applying concepts or experiences from another sphere of activity (cf.
Mulkay, 1979, p. 105). It emphasises the collective nature of science; the necessity for
sustained informal contacts with other scientists (cf. Collins & Harrison, 1975), and the
medical community, in order for new knowledge and technologies to be produced. It also
demonstrates how new products may be developed as a response, not to scientific “proof”
(for this may come later, if at all), but to the “construction” of a socio-clinical problem
and a building awareness of a possible industrial “solution”. A partial “consensus” about
a problem with the absorption and acid destruction of the drug was reached within the
scientific and medical communities prior to the provision of conclusive “proof”, and in
the face of contradictory evidence: a not entirely unique event, as Gilbert (1976) shows in
his study of radars. It also reveals the historical indeterminacy of a technology; for a very
different product may have resulted if, for example, Boggiano and Gleeson had agreed to
protect the short term interests of the pharmaceutical industry by failing to disclose their
findings on erythromycin efficacy; if Scammell and Boggiano had not convinced other
members of the board to support the further development of erythromycin; or if changes
in the state-financed Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) had not, in 1971, enhanced
the possibility of profit from an improved, future erythromycin product.
The above account identifies Boggiano as an inventor of the idea upon which the
new product was based, and differs little from many other case studies within the
sociology of science/technology tradition. Like these others, however, it fails to
incorporate analytical reflexivity, and hence uncritically reproduces an historical
narrative of heroic “discovery” which took place without the intervention of the
researcher. Consequently, as we shall see, the socio-technical construction of Eryc has
only partly been told.
The application of primary analytical reflexivity to the case of Eryc reveals the
researcher’s significant role in the identification of Boggiano as the “inventor”.
Admittedly, the extent to which a particular researcher can contribute to the
“construction” of the inventor will vary in practice. In most case studies, researchers do
not “construct” the inventor, for they do not challenge existing accounts, but merely
reiterate past claims about the identity of a given inventor from previous studies or
reports (e.g., Hong, 1998). Unless the research is specifically about a case of “mistaken
identity”, further research on this matter is not considered important to the problem at
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hand. In a case such as Eryc however, where the identity of the inventor was previously
unknown (or known to only a small number of individuals), the researcher bears greater
individual responsibility for “constructing” the inventor per se, for in producing a case
study or “history”, knowledge is being “created” as well as legitimised and transmitted
into the future.
Further insights are produced with the application of analytical reflexivity. We
can note for example, that the focus of this study, like others in the sociology of
science/technology, is on a defined sphere of social, or socio-technical action, and largely
excludes the contributions of those external to the scientific community. This is because,
for the most part, the sociology of science/technology presumes, rather than
problematises, the boundaries between “science” and “non-science”. Although scientific
activity is acknowledged to be collective (cf. Shapin, 1995), analysis is usually restricted
to a narrow sphere of action regarded as “scientific work”, and little thought is given to
how this activity is conducted within a much larger, hierarchically-organised production
system in which the relative value and reward for various tasks, skills, roles, and status
positions are differentiated and determined. Most accounts do not explore the hidden
assumptions which guide the granting of significance to specific kinds of actions and
individuals in particular roles. The resulting case studies merely reproduce the
hierarchical context of science, contribute to the prevailing belief in science as a distinct
and highly valuable arena of social action, and fail to problematise its relations of power
and prestige. As a consequence, the convention is to prioritise the contribution of “the
inventor”, Boggiano, over that of Scammell, the laboratory assistant, the individuals who
made the test tubes, answered the telephones, or provided security services. Although it
might well be useful and legitimate for an individual researcher to focus exclusively on a
specific sphere of social action as an analytical exercise (as Weber did in The Protestant
Ethic), the sociology of science/technology could only benefit from problematising the
prevailing assumptions of the field; including the distinction between “science” and
“non-science”, and the very Western-centred, individualised, liberal-democratic
conception of the inventor, which celebrates an individual contribution and prioritises
“scientific contributions” over others.
The application of primary analytical reflexivity would, moreover, be a valuable
exercise in the sociology of science/technology, because it reveals the theoretical “logic”
behind the narrative. The case study of Eryc, for example, is shown to employ a
presentist approach to history.
Presentism means that individuals, events or
phenomenon, considered significant in the present context, are traced to an origin point in
the past, and a small selection of elements from the empirical past are ordered into a
coherent narrative to explain its trajectory. The presentist approach to history has been
criticised as an artificially constructed mythology in which imputed social actions and
causal relationships did not, in fact, take place (cf. Jones, 1974; Seidman, 1985, p. 14;
Skinner, 1969). Most sociology of science/technology accounts are presentist because
they take the technology or new idea from the present, and trace an historical pathway in
which objects or ideas are passed (and perhaps transformed) between actors or sites of
interaction over time. Yet the selection of a “point of origin”, as well as the object of
analysis, are relatively arbitrary. Just as a standard “family tree” restricts the
identification of an individual’s forebears to the male line, leaves out illegitimate liaisons
and offspring, and so disregards half the genetic “history” (and almost all evidence of

Fran Collyer

334

social history); a presentist “history” is highly selective and distorted. In the case study
of Eryc, the author of the account might have focused their gaze elsewhere, and found,
for example, the “origin” of Eryc in the first articulation of a theory of the operation of
the pyloric sphincter, the development of the first antibiotic, or even the formation of the
PBS. Yet the limitations of this approach to the past are rarely discussed in this literature,
and few scholars appear aware of their assumption that there is an historical pathway and
an historical “root” which can be “traced” and “located” by the researcher.
The conventional alternative to presentism, is to view the past as characterised by
disjuncture and disruption, with each idea, event or technology historically located and
created anew in an historical “moment”. This is the historicist conception of history,
where the historian seeks to place events, individuals and ideas in their historical context,
and to “understand the past, completely as possible, in its own terms” (Jones, 1974, p.
355). In the historicist approach to history, knowledge is pertinent only to a particular
problem and intention (Skinner, 1969, p. 50) and is therefore always “new” (Seidman,
1983, p. 85). From an historicist perspective, it is not legitimate to trace the history of a
particular idea (Camic, 1997, p. 6): nor indeed the history of a technology or scientific
controversy. Hence the historicist approach is rarely found in the sociology of
science/technology.
Actor-network theory offers a variation on the conventional, presentist, sociology
of science/technology approach to historical case studies. Rather than focus on the
technology as it appears over time, there is an attempt to over-come distinctions between
object and context, actant and background, and past and present, by defining the essence
of an innovation in the totality of the innovation network (cf. Latour, 1991, p. 115). The
focus on the whole rather than its parts, takes into account the way in which all elements
within the network are co-produced and transformed over time, such that at the
“temporary” end to the story, none of the original actants can be found (Latour, 1991, p.
117). This enables a problematisation of the concept of invention, for in the invention of
the Kodak camera, Latour argues the invention may be the camera, but it might equally
be the creation of the patent system, the development in paper processing, or even the
emergence of a mass market for amateur photography. In this approach, rather than
explaining an innovation’s historical path retrospectively, an empiricist, historicist
approach is assumed, and the researcher takes what an actor does to an innovation to
define the actors (cf. Latour, 1991, p. 121). Also consistent with an historicist approach
is the rejection of the necessity of the researcher’s intervention to ascertain causality and
explain socio-technical change. For the historicist, authenticity can be found in the
integrity of the text itself (Jones, 1974, p. 355). Similarly, for Latour, no “third party” or
“external” point of view is essential, for an innovation is explained by “triangulating the
many points of view of the actors” (Latour, 1991, p. 124). Admittedly, the researcher has
a role in weighing up the importance of each element within the case study (Latour, 1991,
p. 116), but it is the examination of the actions of the actor with regard to the innovation
that allows the “cause” of the innovation to be found (Latour, 1991, p. 121).
Weber’s approach to history offers a compromise between the presentist approach
of conventional sociologies of science/technology, and the historicism of actor-network
theory. Although most historians perceive the actors from the past to be central to our
understanding of the past, Weber’s theoretical schema proposes two sets of actors which
must be taken into account. These are the actors from the past who were significant in
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the creation and transmission of new ideas (or technologies), but also a second set of
actors, who in the present context “make sense” of the past by “constructing” these past
acts and events as “social facts”. Both sets of actors are socially and historically located
(cf: Weber 1968), and orient their actions to that which is meaningful (cf. Weber, 1949,
p. 78). Weber’s theories can be readily coupled with the notion of a primary analytical
reflexive researcher, who, in constructing a case study and producing a “history”, is a
significant social actor in the co-production of an invention and an inventor. Added to
the concept of the analytical, reflexive researcher however, must be Weber’s theory of
history, for he argues the past cannot be adequately understood either retrospectively, as
it is in the presentist approach to history, by constructing the past according to present
definitions and concerns; nor can it be assumed, as it is in historicism, that the “facts” of
the case study will in themselves explain the trajectory of an idea (or technology) and
thus historical change. Weber’s proposition is that our understanding of the past will
come from combining both empirical study and theoretical reasoning with the critical
reflection of the historian. The latter, which has been discussed in this paper under the
notion of primary analytical reflexivity, is the process through which the historian reflects
on how they have constructed socio-historical facts from empirical reality and social
theory, and, importantly, how they use these social facts to explain the past.
Extrapolating from Weber’s theories of knowledge and history, it can be proposed
that standard case studies from the sociology of science/technology and the translation
network approach, are, in effect, “ideal types” illustrating unique patterns of social or
socio-technical action in a given historical context (cf. Weber, 1949, pp. 101-103). The
reflexive researcher will neither conflate these with the empirical world, nor assume the
analysis is complete once the “historical sketch” has been drafted. For Weber (1949:1013), the construction of an ideal type is an essential first step in analysis, but is always
partial and distorted; does not capture the “intrinsic” nature of reality (Kalberg, 1997, p.
222; Weber, 1949, pp. 72-73); and is unable to provide the means to demonstrate
causality (Kalberg, 1997, pp. 222-223; Weber, 1949, p. 102). Understanding causality
for Weber is the second step in analysis, within which the ideal type can serve only as a
reference point. In other words, while Latour and the historicists seek causality within
the bounded arena of action described in the case study, and the sociologists of
science/technology find it within the internal dynamic of science or the social context; for
Weber (1968, p. 29), historical change is produced through a multiplicity of social forces,
but the imputation of causality in a case study is an action of the researcher.
Conclusions
The case of Eryc has demonstrated the critical role of the researcher in the
construction of a history of an invention, and how reflection on this process is the tool
sociology provides for taking scholars one small step beyond the positionality of
perspective. While sociology has, for the past century, increasingly provided room for
reflection on the relationship between the “knower” and the production of “knowledge”,
Weber’s theories of knowledge and of history re-focus our attention on the sociohistorical construction of the “object of knowledge” and the “objectifying relations”
which also shape our perceptions. The application of Weber’s theories in this field
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indicate that reflection on this process is critical to escaping the “gravitational pull” of
conventional sociological analysis.
Recent sociology of science/technology approaches to invention indicate the
complex interweaving of social and technological phenomena, but have yet to incorporate
primary analytical reflexivity into their case studies or theoretical schema. While the
concepts of co-production, mutual constitution and the translation process resolve many
previous limitations, there is a need to acknowledge the researcher as equally an actant in
the co-production of social and technological change. Without primary analytical
reflexivity, which necessitates an awareness of the researcher’s subjective-objective
“choices”, the historical trajectory of an innovation, its constituent elements, and the
causal forces that brought it into being, are unlikely to be fully expounded.
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